Defense
AI security for defense systems.
Model release integrity for defense systems. Vraelis does not build weapons or mission software.
Why it matters
A model update crosses organizations.
Updates cross organizations
Trained by one team, integrated by another, operated by a third.
An unapproved change is a security event
A different release, or the wrong destination, changes what the system does.
Reviewers need to read the evidence
What was approved, for where, and what the system reports running.
How Vraelis Contour would apply
How Vraelis Contour worksFive steps, release to record.
Identify the release
Bind approval to the release and destination
Destination-bound approval: test approval cannot carry into operations.
Integrate with a supported runtime
Compare approved and reported
Preserve discrepancies, missing evidence and recovery
Our position
The builder should not be the only judge.
Security software only
Vraelis does not decide how a system is used.
Approval apart from the builder
In the experiment, release authorization separates publisher, deployer and approver roles. The trace keeps a receipt digest, not the approver's identity.
A record kept in order
Every observation is kept, including ones that confirm nothing.
Limits
What we do not claim.
- No deployments in defense systems, and no customers.
- No contracts, security clearances or government authorizations.
- No access to classified or restricted environments.
- No certification, and no claim of fitness for operational use.
- No protection against adversarial inputs or perception attacks.
- No hardware attestation. Runtime identity is a worker self-report.
Related research
Build stronger evidence for model releases.
Join us in building Vraelis Contour.